Disspelling convention: Does paying a QB top-10 money really doom a franchise? (Pay attention, Cowboys)
By Bob Sturm 3h ago
This column is not about Dak Prescott.
It will obviously be applied to the stack of information we use to spark theories about how to build a football team — and plug in a highly-compensated QB in the middle of it — but this is not actually a discussion about whether he is worth a massive contract. It’s also not about whether the Cowboys should pull the trigger and get this deal done.
It is about the idea that paying a QB is generally a bad idea. The argument that a team can no longer win in today’s NFL by paying its QB the going rate.
I don’t remember the first time I was sent a piece of research that assured me that if a team spends more than 12 to 14 percent of their salary cap on their QB, they simply could not remain competitive. If you look
places like NFL Reddit or
my Twitter feed, you will see that conversation happening on a regular basis. It tends to follow teams that are signing their QB to a mega-deal. It happened in Green Bay, Seattle and Kansas City — and, yes, it is now happening in Dallas.
This also isn’t a conversation about whether Dak Prescott can be compared to Russell Wilson or Pat Mahomes for football reasons. It’s about the role of a QB salary and whether you can win by moving the percentage of their money up.
I believe the NFL changes at a snail’s pace. As I tweeted this weekend, the object of the game is not to wait to see what everyone else does since 1994 but rather to figure out where the game is headed and act accordingly to that. If you are last to the party, you suffer consequences. But if you understand where things are going, you don’t make as many ill-informed mistakes.
THE 13 PERCENT THEORY
So, let’s start at the top. What is this theory and where did it start?
In 1994, the NFL instituted a salary-cap system that changed the league forever. In that year, the cap sat at about $34 million. In 2020, we believe it will finally jump over the $200 million barrier. It is linked to league revenues, and aside from a brief pull-back in another labor dispute in 2010-2013, the cap has risen by between $5 million and $15 million every year over the last two decades.
Concurrently, top salaries have risen, too. It probably isn’t totally fair, but despite every single sport having a slightly different way to govern player costs, they all seem to result in the highest class of players seeing their money expand exponentially while the middle class gets shrunk and stifled. Not all growth is constant and equal. It quickly turns into a marketplace where positions are ranked by importance and scarcity, which drives the QB market right up the charts in quick fashion.
According to historical salary data — which can often be difficult to check for accuracy — the top salary on a roster has often been less than 10 percent of the total cap pool for an entire roster. In fact,
according to this very unofficial study, only five times has a Super Bowl winner featured a QB salary that eclipsed 10 percent of the cap. Only once did it go as high as 13 percent (1994 San Francisco with Steve Young).
Media and fans latched on to that. Because nobody had ever won a Super Bowl and employed a player being paid a higher percentage of the cap than Young did in 1994, that must prove it’s impossible, right? Could you go 16-0 and then lose the Super Bowl? This is the fun in arbitrary numbers or facts to try to attach meaning to things in sports.
NOTE: NFL accounting can be very complex, especially when teams can move money around to massage a certain year’s salary cap. The above study and many others do not adjust for this and therefore feature many errors. This is why we will use “annual average value or AAV” when discussing these deals so as to not be confused by how the money is specifically paid out. The AAV flattens it all and helps us see apples to apples.
This number has moved plenty since people started noticing that high salaries would seem to weaken a supporting cast and therefore make winning more difficult. It is a very sound theory that makes intuitive sense, of course. The theory is having more good players make winning easier. If one guy is hogging all the money, then his mates have to go elsewhere to get theirs.
There is a trade-off to having scarce talents. We see this constantly in the NBA, and it drives salaries above $50 million a year now. Nobody would dispute that having LeBron James and Anthony Davis means that the rest of your roster will be much worse. But it is a trade-off you happily make. Giannis Antetokounmpo can sign a five-year, $254 million deal this summer which will confirm that unique talents can make all the money in that league despite a salary cap that is projected at $116 million. That will pay him about 44 percent of the cap, but, of course, the caps are different in the sports. In the NBA, you can exceed the number in exchange for a tax. In the NFL, you cannot.
Most of us enjoy establishing absolutes within our sports discussions. The theory in the NFL that a team’s top player (QB) should stay below a threshold is an easy one to understand and to share the wealth. If Steve Young is the line, then Russell Wilson cannot do this, and therefore that settles the issue. Of course, it never works that way. In fact, once someone noticed that you would rather pay your QB nothing or at least under 10 percent of your cap to try to win a Super Bowl, we had to keep moving the bar to keep up.
For instance, the 2011 Super Bowl — when the Giants beat the Patriots — featured two of the highest-paid players in the sport squaring off at QB. The third-highest paid QB, Eli Manning, was making 13.5 percent of the salary cap. He beat Tom Brady, who was making 15 percent of the cap. At the time, the magic number was 13 percent, but had Mario Manningham not caught that sideline pass from Manning, the new number would have moved up to “you can’t pay more than 15 percent” to your QB and win a Super Bowl. Instead, we just moved it to 13.5 percent.
2014 almost blew the whole theory out of the water. You may recall that Aaron Rodgers made 17 percent of the cap that year. But his team could not recover an onside kick in Seattle at the end of the NFC Championship Game and therefore we didn’t have to move the number up to 17 percent that year. Apparently, you can only go to the point of the season where you are leading by two touchdowns in the fourth quarter of the NFC Championship Game with a QB who makes that much money.
Meanwhile, I have used this visual aid in the past, but let me dust it off again. This chart below shows you how the sport has obviously evolved to where our game’s LeBrons and Giannises
(EditOr’s note: Gianni?) are quite obviously the quarterbacks:
This is the most basic demonstration of the game’s strategic and economic turn in the last 50 years. People mention the running backs who used to run the league and the fact that most of those top RBs have a hard time getting their money now. Above, you see the simple run-vs-pass balance by decade. The league is heading in one direction, and there are few signs it will change. This year’s Super Bowl champion Kansas City Chiefs pushed the boundaries even further by winning the Super Bowl while passing the ball on 61.6 percent of offensive snaps. They cut Kareem Hunt, who won the 2017 rushing title, and actually improved without him. The revolution is continuing, and that red line will continue upwards as the copycats continue to follow.
This, of course, means that QBs are in higher demand. And that means the compensation of said QB will continue to rise as those without the QBs cannot compete. If they can break through, they can’t stay competitive without finding their own.
I think trying to figure out the nuanced differences between the salary structures of the mid 1990’s is pretty irrelevant. So much has changed in just the last 10 years that trying to figure out how the 2002 Tampa Bay Buccaneers structured their money is pointless. But this last decade does seem relevant. So I wanted to set you at ease on my findings about the “dangers of paying a QB,” and we can go from there.
First, some ground rules. We will start with this latest collective bargaining agreement, which began in 2011. We will use AAV and league ranking among QB. If a QB is among the league’s top 10 at his position, he is also a top-10 player in the NFL. How do I know this? Well, in the last decade, almost every top-10 salary is a QB, with only a very few exceptions. Since 2013, only Khalil Mack and Aaron Donald have cracked the Top 10 without throwing the ball. In 2019, the top 11 AAV players were all QBs. All of them!
I also think “he hasn’t won a Super Bowl” is tailored to win an argument. I think it’s necessary to account for the thin margins of one play and one call and one bounce deciding these outcomes, and suggesting that the QB salary was the reason that the Saints didn’t win a Super Bowl in 2018 is silly. They were victimized by a bad call. In my methodology, if you make the final four teams and play in a conference championship game and definitely a Super Bowl, you deserve to take part in this study.
The numbers are salary rankings among QBs. The green applies to a player is on a rookie contract, and the red indicates a player is ranked among the top 10 QBs (and players) in the entire NFL. Here is what we have for this decade:
We have nine years of names, four per year, for a total of 36 samples.
13 (36 percent) are QBs on their rookie deals. If you are unclear, there is no question the best way to win a Super Bowl in today’s NFL is to draft a QB and immediately go on a run. That’s tough to do, because your roster is not usually ready to do this, but if you can channel Russell Wilson or Pat Mahomes, you can do this.
12 (33 percent) are veteran QBs on inexpensive deals. This is what everyone wants: a QB who is good and experienced, but cheap enough that he can have a good team around him. Here is the problem with this group. Of the twelve, six are Tom Brady, who played for a very cheap deal for much of his twilight from 2013 through 2018. That actually means there are only six cases outside of Brady (16 percent), and they involve Alex Smith, twice, with San Francisco (one he shared with Colin Kaepernick, who made even less money but was on a rookie deal), Peyton Manning at the end of his career, Carson Palmer, Matt Ryan and the year Sam Bradford/Case Keenum made a run in Minnesota in 2017.
That’s it. Those are the only exceptions.
11 (31 percent) are QBs on top-10 deals. This, in my opinion, is where the market is going. There will be fewer of the middle-class QBs in the mix because Tom Brady is not going to prop up that category anymore. I anticipate we will see names in either red or green from now on.
And what will that mean? It will mean the aforementioned 13-percent rule goes away. In fact, Jimmy Garoppolo was eighth in the NFL last year, and he cost nearly 15 percent of the cap. Aaron Rodgers had his team one win from the Super Bowl again, and he was at 18 percent. He beat Russell Wilson’s Seahawks in the playoffs, and Russ made 19 percent.
Pat Mahomes will sign a deal that will very likely break the 20-percent barrier. Can the Chiefs still win with a roster like that? Of course they can. They may not be able to have a top-paid running back, center and guard anymore, but I predict in five years that many teams will have broken 20 percent to secure their QBs’ services. Will they all win Super Bowls? Of course not. Super Bowls remain rare; the mean team has a 3.125 percent chance of securing one in any given year. But unless the new CBA caps individual salaries, QBs will still take more and more of the pie as every other position sees their growth slow down.
You must have a QB. You also have to pick the right one. But the idea that you can lock down a really promising player in his mid-20’s and not expect to pay the going rate, whatever crazy number that is, will leave you on the outside looking in.
Again, this is not a Dak Prescott study. It was done mostly to demonstrate how out of date the 13-percent or 15-percent rule has become. I predict Mahomes is not done competing for Super Bowls. I also predict all of his future Super Bowls will invalidate that old Reddit theory, as he will wind up at 20 percent or so. The idea is to be ahead of the curve, not behind it, and you can expect the top 10 QBs to all be making “Giannis money” before too long.
Please don’t try convincing your friends you want to win with a QB who will be 22nd in salary at his position. It can happen, but only on rookie deals. After that’s over, it’s time to pay the man.