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Weekend Cowboys Riffing – Contextualizing the Cowboys’ numbers
By Bob Sturm 5h ago 5
194 days since the final game of last season, 12 days until training camp opens in Oxnard, 58 days until the Week 1 game at Carolina at 3:25 pm.
For about a decade, I have been charting the Dallas Cowboys’ offensive and defensive performances into Excel Spreadsheets and filling up the hard drives of my various laptops with a mountain of numbers that continues to grow. I am a pack rat by nature and figured at some point I would take the information on every snap from 2008-2017 and put it together in some massive database of knowledge that might allow a better understanding of what Jason Garrett is thinking on third and long from inside his own 30-yard line.
I still haven’t quite figured out how to best do that, but I know after every game, I watch the game again to make sure my data is as close to accurate as I can possibly get. Why have I done it all of these years? Well, to be honest, I started a decade ago because I was frustrated that this sort of information was not out there anywhere else.
I would hear (or participate) in a discussion – some call these arguments – about whether the Cowboys have been playing more man coverage lately or whether they have seen more blitzes on early downs or whatever with anecdotal information we would compile from the observation of a few memorable plays. But it always drove me a little crazy, because using information from 3-5 plays over the vast course of a 1,000 snap season seems inefficient and inaccurate.
The answers were out there. The teams knew them. They just weren’t telling the public. So, if I want to know how many blitzes the Cowboys are running – by down and distance – I was going to have to keep them all by hand. Then, the real killer: knowing what that number means. Let’s say it’s 31%, that number doesn’t mean much without context for what the rest of the league is doing in that same situation. Maybe 31% is a lot of blitzes. Maybe it isn’t very many at all. We not only needed the Cowboys’ information, but I also needed the rest of the league’s number to see how it all fit together.
As you can see, this reads a little like a diary of a madman, but my intentions were good.
Thankfully, over the course of the last decade, the analytics boom has happened. I am not saying we have arrived at the destination, but we are miles and miles down the track from when my projects started in 2008 on personnel groupings, routes, blitzes, and coverages. There are many #footballnerds like me out there doing similar work. Better yet, there are now full-fledged companies who have decided to take on the whole league’s data and compile it for their users in an easy, searchable way.
Enter my new friends from Sportradar and their massive NFL database that I recently swam in to see what I could see. This context that they provide, as well as information that I have never attempted to collect from the Cowboys, is in there in more detail each season as we go. I am able to answer plenty of my own questions – which of course lead to all-new questions.
I don’t want to throw too much at you on this fine July morning, but know that the context of the league’s numbers on certain things will allow a better understanding of the unique characteristics of each team’s performance. I am not saying we have as much information as the teams themselves now, but the gap is so much smaller than it was in 2008.
OFFENSIVE PERSONNEL GROUPING PERFORMANCES – 2017
For instance, let’s do a little basic offensive analysis based on what I have tracked all of these years and now the context of the league.
If you have followed the “Decoding Linehan” series that runs on Tuesdays after Sunday games, it is an effort to deconstruct the Cowboys offensive gameplan and analyze how successful it has been.
The entire NFL has joined the Cowboys in running 11 personnel out of shotgun as its most common personnel grouping. 11 personnel (1 RB, 1TE, 3WR) was run by the NFL 14,871 times last season, with Pittsburgh using it the most times (648) and New Orleans using it the fewest (306). This makes plenty of sense because we know that Pittsburgh has perhaps the most devastating 11 personnel grouping ever assembled, and that New Orleans has really discovered a two-running back shotgun set that works better for them with the dynamic RB duo they currently enjoy.
Dallas ran this grouping out 448 times last season which falls just below the league average of 464 snaps. They also were below league-average in production, but not significantly, as they finished with 5.47 yards per play in this grouping while the league averaged 5.70. Clearly, though, the Cowboys aren’t looking to be average with Dez Bryant, Jason Witten, Ezekiel Elliott, Cole Beasley, and Terrance Williams. They figured they would be significantly better than 19th. After all, in 2016, they were 7th in the NFL with 6.29 per snap out of 11 personnel.
Like all sorts of things from 2017, we can blame a lot of things on the suspension of Ezekiel Elliott and the injury to Tyron Smith which, when combined, meant that over the course of the final eight games the two played only three plays together. That is a staggering fact that explains plenty of the year. It also applies to the season in 11 personnel (shotgun). The Cowboys weren’t terribly productive after the Chiefs game. But you should know that the grouping had four of their best five weeks of the season during those first two months with Zeke and Tyron. Once they left, the grouping fell below Cleveland in productivity.
That’s right. From Week 11 through the rest of the season, the Cowboys averaged 5.1 yards per snap over 222 plays in this most favored grouping, which dropped them below the 5.15 that Cleveland was racking up with DeShone Kizer at the helm as part of that 0-16 campaign.
The most productive 11 personnel/Shotgun teams?
Top 5: Saints (who ran it the least but averaged 7.51 yards per snap!), Falcons, Chargers, Chiefs, and Steelers.
Bottom 5: Broncos, 49ers, Packers, Titans, and Ravens.
Dallas had 1,005 offensive plays in 2017 and as I mentioned, that grouping above was used in 45% of them. When utilizing this combination, they ran the ball 22% of the time and passed 78%.
The second-most used grouping for the Cowboys was also 11 personnel – but under center. By the way, some teams and statisticians combine the two under the premise that it is all 11-personnel, but I don’t like to do that, because the characteristics of each are so different based completely on the position of the QB at the snap. If he is under center, there is a chance at play-action and the Cowboys run the ball 78%. When he is in shotgun they run the ball 22% and that is almost all from RPOs and Zone Reads. So, if the whole point of this exercise is to reveal tendencies and habits, combining the two into one classification would just show you a 50% run/pass ratio, which is not at all indicative of the Cowboys’ tendencies. But if I can tell you that by the positioning of Dak Prescott, there is 80% likelihood of a run under center and 80% likelihood of a pass back in shotgun, that seems particularly useful.
Dallas used this 16% of their plays and gained 4.83 per snap for 14th in the NFL and as I said above, they run/pass was 78%/22% out of this grouping.
This set was used the most by the Rams, who took 409 snaps in this grouping. The Carolina Panthers almost never used it, with 31 all season.
Top 5: Patriots, Rams, Eagles, Packers, and Jets.
Worst 5 (yards/play): Bears, Giants, Colts, Panthers, and Titans.
The third and fourth most-used personnel groupings for the Cowboys in 2017 were 12 personnel (1 RB, 2 TE, 2 WR) and 13 personnel (1 RB, 3 TE, 1 WR) from under center. They ran 12 personnel for 114 plays and 13 personnel 91 more times. Combined, that results in over a dozen snaps per game. Substantial parts of the game plan, for sure.
In 12 personnel, the Cowboys were fourth in the league and rolled up 6.14 yard per play in a league where the average was 5.2. They were very impressive and pretty balanced, with a 62% run rate allowing for all sorts of bootlegs and play-action. Everything worked pretty well together in 12 personnel. Atlanta, New Orleans, and the LA Chargers were more productive, but that was it. The worst 12 personnel teams in the league under center were the Bills, Colts, 49ers, Texans, and very surprisingly, the Eagles.
The bad news for the Cowboys on this front is that almost all of the 12 personnel plays featured Jason Witten and James Hanna – both who are gone from the roster. Should they want to continue with this grouping, we will need to have some faith in the TEs on the roster – which is why training camp is extra vital this season.
13 personnel was not quite as useful, but still decent enough. The Cowboys were 11th in this grouping and ran the ball 76% of the time here for 4.65 per play. The good news there is that they are declaring their intentions to run, then doing just that, and getting nearly 5 yards a carry. Nicely done. There was no team in football that ran so many snaps out of 13 personnel, so maybe you could argue the Titans were more productive than Dallas, but not by much. But again, how much of this was based on Witten and Hanna?
Now, let’s focus on the defense.
BLITZING TENDENCIES BY DOWN/DISTANCE – 2017
The Cowboys under Rod Marinelli are not a blitzing team at all. They seem to try blitzing less and less each year. In each of the last three seasons, the Cowboys were comfortably in the bottom third of the league on bringing more than four pass-rushers – always hovering around 20% in a league where the average has been 27% or more (30% in 2015).
This isn’t necessarily good or bad. Blitzing teams are dangerous and scary when used right, but I cannot think of anything less correlated with winning football than blitz rate. Many times, teams that blitz a lot do so because they are poor at getting pressure with four rushers. Many teams that don’t blitz don’t have to. Each team is evaluated individually because every situation needs context. The Jacksonville Jaguars were second in the NFL in sacks and blitzed the 31s- most.
I heard it said once that blitzing must be used as a weapon, not a necessity. I think that fits really well. But, since we are here, how much do the Cowboys blitz relative to the league averages according to Sportradar?
As you can see, it just isn’t their thing. The Cowboys prefer to play safe zone coverages behind conservative pressures that employ stunts and movements from the rush four, but otherwise, Marinelli is not a “man on an island” coverage guy at all. He wants numbers in his secondary to make sure that the big plays are limited.
Dallas allowed the sixth-fewest explosive plays due to this tactic. They may not generate the takeaways you want, but they are making teams drive the ball to get their points – which is a very sound strategy if you don’t think you have superior personnel.
Who are the most- and least-aggressive blitz teams?
First down: Most blitzes, in order – Carolina, Houston, Arizona, Miami, and Detroit.
Least – Cincinnati, Jacksonville, Seattle, LA Chargers, and Philadelphia. (you may notice that the teams that have the best pass-rushing defensive lines don’t blitz because they don’t need to).
Second down: Most – LA Rams, Cleveland, Carolina, Tennessee, and New Orleans.
Least – Kansas City, Cincinnati, LA Chargers, Jacksonville, and Oakland.
Third down: Most – Cleveland, New Orleans, Carolina, NY Jets, Denver.
Least – Jacksonville, Tampa Bay, Oakland, Miami, and Dallas.
Third and long: Most – Cleveland, Carolina, NY Jets, Denver, New Orleans.
Least – Oakland, Tampa Bay, Dallas, Philadelphia, and Miami.
Overall: Most blitzes in 2017 – Carolina, Cleveland, Houston, New Orleans, and NY Jets.
Least – Cincinnati, Jacksonville, LA Chargers, Kansas City, and Oakland.
That is enough for today, but I hope you enjoyed some insight that I have never had access to before – that will no doubt fill in some gaps for us here in 2018.
By Bob Sturm 5h ago 5
194 days since the final game of last season, 12 days until training camp opens in Oxnard, 58 days until the Week 1 game at Carolina at 3:25 pm.
For about a decade, I have been charting the Dallas Cowboys’ offensive and defensive performances into Excel Spreadsheets and filling up the hard drives of my various laptops with a mountain of numbers that continues to grow. I am a pack rat by nature and figured at some point I would take the information on every snap from 2008-2017 and put it together in some massive database of knowledge that might allow a better understanding of what Jason Garrett is thinking on third and long from inside his own 30-yard line.
I still haven’t quite figured out how to best do that, but I know after every game, I watch the game again to make sure my data is as close to accurate as I can possibly get. Why have I done it all of these years? Well, to be honest, I started a decade ago because I was frustrated that this sort of information was not out there anywhere else.
I would hear (or participate) in a discussion – some call these arguments – about whether the Cowboys have been playing more man coverage lately or whether they have seen more blitzes on early downs or whatever with anecdotal information we would compile from the observation of a few memorable plays. But it always drove me a little crazy, because using information from 3-5 plays over the vast course of a 1,000 snap season seems inefficient and inaccurate.
The answers were out there. The teams knew them. They just weren’t telling the public. So, if I want to know how many blitzes the Cowboys are running – by down and distance – I was going to have to keep them all by hand. Then, the real killer: knowing what that number means. Let’s say it’s 31%, that number doesn’t mean much without context for what the rest of the league is doing in that same situation. Maybe 31% is a lot of blitzes. Maybe it isn’t very many at all. We not only needed the Cowboys’ information, but I also needed the rest of the league’s number to see how it all fit together.
As you can see, this reads a little like a diary of a madman, but my intentions were good.
Thankfully, over the course of the last decade, the analytics boom has happened. I am not saying we have arrived at the destination, but we are miles and miles down the track from when my projects started in 2008 on personnel groupings, routes, blitzes, and coverages. There are many #footballnerds like me out there doing similar work. Better yet, there are now full-fledged companies who have decided to take on the whole league’s data and compile it for their users in an easy, searchable way.
Enter my new friends from Sportradar and their massive NFL database that I recently swam in to see what I could see. This context that they provide, as well as information that I have never attempted to collect from the Cowboys, is in there in more detail each season as we go. I am able to answer plenty of my own questions – which of course lead to all-new questions.
I don’t want to throw too much at you on this fine July morning, but know that the context of the league’s numbers on certain things will allow a better understanding of the unique characteristics of each team’s performance. I am not saying we have as much information as the teams themselves now, but the gap is so much smaller than it was in 2008.
OFFENSIVE PERSONNEL GROUPING PERFORMANCES – 2017
For instance, let’s do a little basic offensive analysis based on what I have tracked all of these years and now the context of the league.
If you have followed the “Decoding Linehan” series that runs on Tuesdays after Sunday games, it is an effort to deconstruct the Cowboys offensive gameplan and analyze how successful it has been.
The entire NFL has joined the Cowboys in running 11 personnel out of shotgun as its most common personnel grouping. 11 personnel (1 RB, 1TE, 3WR) was run by the NFL 14,871 times last season, with Pittsburgh using it the most times (648) and New Orleans using it the fewest (306). This makes plenty of sense because we know that Pittsburgh has perhaps the most devastating 11 personnel grouping ever assembled, and that New Orleans has really discovered a two-running back shotgun set that works better for them with the dynamic RB duo they currently enjoy.
Dallas ran this grouping out 448 times last season which falls just below the league average of 464 snaps. They also were below league-average in production, but not significantly, as they finished with 5.47 yards per play in this grouping while the league averaged 5.70. Clearly, though, the Cowboys aren’t looking to be average with Dez Bryant, Jason Witten, Ezekiel Elliott, Cole Beasley, and Terrance Williams. They figured they would be significantly better than 19th. After all, in 2016, they were 7th in the NFL with 6.29 per snap out of 11 personnel.
Like all sorts of things from 2017, we can blame a lot of things on the suspension of Ezekiel Elliott and the injury to Tyron Smith which, when combined, meant that over the course of the final eight games the two played only three plays together. That is a staggering fact that explains plenty of the year. It also applies to the season in 11 personnel (shotgun). The Cowboys weren’t terribly productive after the Chiefs game. But you should know that the grouping had four of their best five weeks of the season during those first two months with Zeke and Tyron. Once they left, the grouping fell below Cleveland in productivity.
That’s right. From Week 11 through the rest of the season, the Cowboys averaged 5.1 yards per snap over 222 plays in this most favored grouping, which dropped them below the 5.15 that Cleveland was racking up with DeShone Kizer at the helm as part of that 0-16 campaign.
The most productive 11 personnel/Shotgun teams?
Top 5: Saints (who ran it the least but averaged 7.51 yards per snap!), Falcons, Chargers, Chiefs, and Steelers.
Bottom 5: Broncos, 49ers, Packers, Titans, and Ravens.
Dallas had 1,005 offensive plays in 2017 and as I mentioned, that grouping above was used in 45% of them. When utilizing this combination, they ran the ball 22% of the time and passed 78%.
The second-most used grouping for the Cowboys was also 11 personnel – but under center. By the way, some teams and statisticians combine the two under the premise that it is all 11-personnel, but I don’t like to do that, because the characteristics of each are so different based completely on the position of the QB at the snap. If he is under center, there is a chance at play-action and the Cowboys run the ball 78%. When he is in shotgun they run the ball 22% and that is almost all from RPOs and Zone Reads. So, if the whole point of this exercise is to reveal tendencies and habits, combining the two into one classification would just show you a 50% run/pass ratio, which is not at all indicative of the Cowboys’ tendencies. But if I can tell you that by the positioning of Dak Prescott, there is 80% likelihood of a run under center and 80% likelihood of a pass back in shotgun, that seems particularly useful.
Dallas used this 16% of their plays and gained 4.83 per snap for 14th in the NFL and as I said above, they run/pass was 78%/22% out of this grouping.
This set was used the most by the Rams, who took 409 snaps in this grouping. The Carolina Panthers almost never used it, with 31 all season.
Top 5: Patriots, Rams, Eagles, Packers, and Jets.
Worst 5 (yards/play): Bears, Giants, Colts, Panthers, and Titans.
The third and fourth most-used personnel groupings for the Cowboys in 2017 were 12 personnel (1 RB, 2 TE, 2 WR) and 13 personnel (1 RB, 3 TE, 1 WR) from under center. They ran 12 personnel for 114 plays and 13 personnel 91 more times. Combined, that results in over a dozen snaps per game. Substantial parts of the game plan, for sure.
In 12 personnel, the Cowboys were fourth in the league and rolled up 6.14 yard per play in a league where the average was 5.2. They were very impressive and pretty balanced, with a 62% run rate allowing for all sorts of bootlegs and play-action. Everything worked pretty well together in 12 personnel. Atlanta, New Orleans, and the LA Chargers were more productive, but that was it. The worst 12 personnel teams in the league under center were the Bills, Colts, 49ers, Texans, and very surprisingly, the Eagles.
The bad news for the Cowboys on this front is that almost all of the 12 personnel plays featured Jason Witten and James Hanna – both who are gone from the roster. Should they want to continue with this grouping, we will need to have some faith in the TEs on the roster – which is why training camp is extra vital this season.
13 personnel was not quite as useful, but still decent enough. The Cowboys were 11th in this grouping and ran the ball 76% of the time here for 4.65 per play. The good news there is that they are declaring their intentions to run, then doing just that, and getting nearly 5 yards a carry. Nicely done. There was no team in football that ran so many snaps out of 13 personnel, so maybe you could argue the Titans were more productive than Dallas, but not by much. But again, how much of this was based on Witten and Hanna?
Now, let’s focus on the defense.
BLITZING TENDENCIES BY DOWN/DISTANCE – 2017
The Cowboys under Rod Marinelli are not a blitzing team at all. They seem to try blitzing less and less each year. In each of the last three seasons, the Cowboys were comfortably in the bottom third of the league on bringing more than four pass-rushers – always hovering around 20% in a league where the average has been 27% or more (30% in 2015).
This isn’t necessarily good or bad. Blitzing teams are dangerous and scary when used right, but I cannot think of anything less correlated with winning football than blitz rate. Many times, teams that blitz a lot do so because they are poor at getting pressure with four rushers. Many teams that don’t blitz don’t have to. Each team is evaluated individually because every situation needs context. The Jacksonville Jaguars were second in the NFL in sacks and blitzed the 31s- most.
I heard it said once that blitzing must be used as a weapon, not a necessity. I think that fits really well. But, since we are here, how much do the Cowboys blitz relative to the league averages according to Sportradar?
As you can see, it just isn’t their thing. The Cowboys prefer to play safe zone coverages behind conservative pressures that employ stunts and movements from the rush four, but otherwise, Marinelli is not a “man on an island” coverage guy at all. He wants numbers in his secondary to make sure that the big plays are limited.
Dallas allowed the sixth-fewest explosive plays due to this tactic. They may not generate the takeaways you want, but they are making teams drive the ball to get their points – which is a very sound strategy if you don’t think you have superior personnel.
Who are the most- and least-aggressive blitz teams?
First down: Most blitzes, in order – Carolina, Houston, Arizona, Miami, and Detroit.
Least – Cincinnati, Jacksonville, Seattle, LA Chargers, and Philadelphia. (you may notice that the teams that have the best pass-rushing defensive lines don’t blitz because they don’t need to).
Second down: Most – LA Rams, Cleveland, Carolina, Tennessee, and New Orleans.
Least – Kansas City, Cincinnati, LA Chargers, Jacksonville, and Oakland.
Third down: Most – Cleveland, New Orleans, Carolina, NY Jets, Denver.
Least – Jacksonville, Tampa Bay, Oakland, Miami, and Dallas.
Third and long: Most – Cleveland, Carolina, NY Jets, Denver, New Orleans.
Least – Oakland, Tampa Bay, Dallas, Philadelphia, and Miami.
Overall: Most blitzes in 2017 – Carolina, Cleveland, Houston, New Orleans, and NY Jets.
Least – Cincinnati, Jacksonville, LA Chargers, Kansas City, and Oakland.
That is enough for today, but I hope you enjoyed some insight that I have never had access to before – that will no doubt fill in some gaps for us here in 2018.
