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By Bob McGinn Jan 7, 2020
Mike McCarthy didn’t do all that winning in Green Bay by fielding superlative offenses, great defenses or even respectable special teams. His teams were never clever and seldom overly physical, and as his 13-year tenure played out few opponents would say they played especially hard.
Where McCarthy built a mini-empire and turned it into a street named for him, widespread adulation and untold wealth was dominating the turnover differential, owning the division and getting the most out of his quarterbacks until his relationship with Aaron Rodgers soured near the end.
Now, as McCarthy attempts to resurrect his coaching career after a 13-month hiatus, many of the attributes that made him a winner with the Packers might translate beautifully into his new gig with the Dallas Cowboys.
McCarthy was fond of saying coaches in the NFL often get what they emphasize, and he learned from Marty Schottenheimer in his six years as an assistant in Kansas City that the giveaway-takeaway ratio was the only way to go. Only one team, the New England Patriots under Bill Belichick, posted a better turnover differential than the Packers did under McCarthy.
In 204 regular-season games with McCarthy at the helm, the Packers finished plus-97. They also were plus-6 in his 18 playoff games, 10 of which were victories.
In the post-Lambeau era, only one coach in Green Bay posted a better turnover margin than McCarthy. That, of course, would be Vince Lombardi, who was plus-115 in 122 regular-season games.
Super Bowl-winning coach Mike Holmgren finished merely plus-7 in his seven seasons. Mike Sherman, another consistent winner with the Packers, ended minus-14 in his six seasons.
McCarthy did it by coaching against giveaways and for takeaways every day, year after year. His skilled-position players always graded A when it came to ball security just as his quarterbacks (read: Rodgers) seldom threw carelessly into harm’s way. His defenses led the NFL in takeaways twice and intercepted 110 passes from 2009-’11.
McCarthy’s Packers controlled the NFC North in similar fashion to how Belichick’s Patriots maintained their stranglehold on the AFC East.
In all, McCarthy went 53-23-2 against the division, a winning percentage of .692. He was 19-7 (.731) against Chicago, 18-7 (.720) against Detroit and 16-9-2 (.629) against Minnesota.
Like much of Jason Garrett’s 9 ½-year tenure in Dallas, Garrett’s work in the most important aspect of winning was average. In his 152 regular-season games, the Cowboys finished minus-2 in turnover differential. In his five playoff games, they were plus-1. Like McCarthy, Garrett had an outstanding record against the NFC East, finishing 38-20 (.655). Now McCarthy can go after further divisional domination with the NFC East coming off a terrible season in which it easily ranked as the weakest of the eight divisions.
McCarthy earned his spurs as an assistant coach tutoring quarterbacks. If he’s said it once he said it 100 times: His most important job as a head coach was to make the quarterback successful.
When McCarthy returned to the Packers in 2006 (he had been their quarterbacks coach in 1999 under Ray Rhodes) Brett Favre’s career was in disarray. The Packers had finished 4-12 in ’05, and Favre’s career-high total of 29 interceptions and 70.9 passer rating were part of the problem.
Immediately, Favre and McCarthy rekindled what had been a strong relationship, and under McCarthy’s firm but steady guidance Favre toned down his impulsiveness, relished a more check-with-me system at the line of scrimmage and posted his best passer rating (95.7) in 11 years as the Packers went 13-3 in 2007.
Few will remember the start of Rodgers’ career. Two years in, there were as many scouts who believed his career would be a bust as there were those who didn’t. He couldn’t have been less impressive.
When I asked Bill Walsh in a 2006 interview if he considered Rodgers, the former Cal quarterback, to be maxed out physically, he said, “That’s right. What you see is what you get. He doesn’t have a great (deal) more potential that doesn’t show. He was part of a system and real outstanding coach (Jeff Tedford) in college and all of that. I don’t know where it’s going to take him.”
McCarthy took a hands-on approach with the quarterback who he rated beneath Alex Smith during his one season as offensive coordinator in San Francisco. Rodgers made dramatic changes in his ball carriage and delivery, increased his arm strength and overall strength, learned about leadership and, by his fourth season, was ready to roll as Favre’s successor.
McCarthy served as his own play-caller on offense until 2015 when he made the mistake of relinquishing those duties to Tom Clements, a trusted assistant and the other individual who deserves substantial credit for developing Rodgers. He returned to play-calling late that season after Rodgers went into a funk from mid-season on. Even though the Packers are entering the playoffs with a 13-3 season, Rodgers and their passing game have seldom regained their pre-2015 pizzazz.
On Thanksgiving Day a year ago, 10 days before McCarthy was fired, CBS analyst Tony Romo said during a telecast, “The league is going to motion and misdirection before the snap … Mike McCarthy just has guys standing there and lets Rodgers do what he wants … jet motion has hurt defenses. It’s really what changed the NFL.”
Continuing to live in Green Bay, McCarthy converted a portion of his compound into a high-tech studio where he and several other unemployed coaches spent the season breaking down tape and analyzing trends. In a series of interviews last month, he pledged to become less static in his approach to offense if accorded another coaching opportunity.
Generally, McCarthy permitted defensive coordinators Bob Sanders, Dom Capers and Mike Pettine to run their own show. He did become heavily involved in game-planning as well as philosophy toward the end of Capers’ nine-year run. Special teams were his Achilles’ heel. Based on Rick Gosselin’s annual rankings, the Carolina Panthers were the only team that had worse special teams during McCarthy’s tenure than the Packers.
McCarthy can be ruthless. He fired 16 assistant coaches in 13 years, including five coordinators. Four others departed after their contracts expired; in at least three of the cases they could be considered firings. Another coach was pressured to retire.
In the area of special teams, McCarthy forced out coordinators Mike Stock, Shawn Slocum and Ron Zook as well as assistants Curtis Fuller and Chad Morton, all to no avail.
General manager Ted Thompson hired McCarthy and had the power to fire him until he was pushed aside after the 2017 season. Team president Mark Murphy fired McCarthy within an hour after the 12th game a year ago. There were between 15,000 and 20,000 no-shows at Lambeau Field when the Packers lost to Arizona, in December no less.
A 13 ½-point favorite over the lowly Cardinals, the Packers suffered their worst defeat at home in 51 years, according to the odds. Public sentiment had turned against McCarthy despite the Super Bowl triumph, the nine playoff appearances and the six NFC North championships.
McCarthy wanted to finish the season and was shocked to be summoned to Murphy’s office so soon after the Cardinals game and quickly dismissed. By doing so, Murphy placed McCarthy, the second-winningest coach in franchise history, in company with Gene Ronzani (14-31-1) as the only Packers’ coach to get canned during the season.
So now McCarthy will inherit a team that missed the playoff this season after a disappointing 8-8 season but is 40-24 since 2016. The offense, which led the NFL in yards (6,904) and yards per play (6.5), offers tremendous potential with quarterback Dak Prescott, Pro Bowl running back Ezekiel Elliott, some high-caliber wide receivers and three Pro Bowl offensive linemen.
There will be many dramatic changes for McCarthy, not the least of which is having his boss serve as the face of the franchise.
The media-shy Thompson avoided interviews like rabies, leaving McCarthy to serve as the single voice. It’s a role Jerry Jones revels in.
By the time the Packers defeated the Pittsburgh Steelers at AT&T Stadium in the 45th Super Bowl, McCarthy had become a powerful voice behind any podium. During the injury-ravaged 2010 season, McCarthy famously insisted the Packers were “nobody’s underdog,” and with his uber-confidence spreading throughout the locker room his team went all the way as the NFC’s sixth seed.
In later years, McCarthy became less engaged in press conferences even though the press corps in Wisconsin can’t be compared to the aggressive tone of the media contingent that will greet him in Dallas.
Over time, McCarthy learned to curb what past associates have described as a volcanic temper. Though somewhat inarticulate and at times thin-skinned, McCarthy can charm acquaintances with his ability to tell a story.
By and large, McCarthy was popular with players. He lessened their physical workload over time, and almost never threw any of them under the proverbial bus. He will have a carefully constructed plan, a rigid schedule and the motivation to prove he’s a lot better than his finish in Green Bay.
In the past few weeks, McCarthy has told people he just wants to coach. He seems to recognize his shortcomings in game management, and in interviews appears all in when it comes to analytics and their expanding role in the NFL game.
Thompson performed poorly in his last two or three years as the GM in Green Bay. Privately, McCarthy complained about Thompson’s inactivity when it came to adding players from outside the organization.
Now McCarthy is joining the Cowboys, for whom Jerry Jones and his son, Stephen, can provide him with more resources than he has known and a willingness to gamble on greatness in everything they do.
The Jones family needed someone to lead the men in their locker room, instill a new message and spirit, and turn a team of consistent underachievers into one of achievers.
McCarthy did that once, a decade ago at least when it comes to reaching the Super Bowl. Time will tell if he’s capable of it again.
Mike McCarthy didn’t do all that winning in Green Bay by fielding superlative offenses, great defenses or even respectable special teams. His teams were never clever and seldom overly physical, and as his 13-year tenure played out few opponents would say they played especially hard.
Where McCarthy built a mini-empire and turned it into a street named for him, widespread adulation and untold wealth was dominating the turnover differential, owning the division and getting the most out of his quarterbacks until his relationship with Aaron Rodgers soured near the end.
Now, as McCarthy attempts to resurrect his coaching career after a 13-month hiatus, many of the attributes that made him a winner with the Packers might translate beautifully into his new gig with the Dallas Cowboys.
McCarthy was fond of saying coaches in the NFL often get what they emphasize, and he learned from Marty Schottenheimer in his six years as an assistant in Kansas City that the giveaway-takeaway ratio was the only way to go. Only one team, the New England Patriots under Bill Belichick, posted a better turnover differential than the Packers did under McCarthy.
In 204 regular-season games with McCarthy at the helm, the Packers finished plus-97. They also were plus-6 in his 18 playoff games, 10 of which were victories.
In the post-Lambeau era, only one coach in Green Bay posted a better turnover margin than McCarthy. That, of course, would be Vince Lombardi, who was plus-115 in 122 regular-season games.
Super Bowl-winning coach Mike Holmgren finished merely plus-7 in his seven seasons. Mike Sherman, another consistent winner with the Packers, ended minus-14 in his six seasons.
McCarthy did it by coaching against giveaways and for takeaways every day, year after year. His skilled-position players always graded A when it came to ball security just as his quarterbacks (read: Rodgers) seldom threw carelessly into harm’s way. His defenses led the NFL in takeaways twice and intercepted 110 passes from 2009-’11.
McCarthy’s Packers controlled the NFC North in similar fashion to how Belichick’s Patriots maintained their stranglehold on the AFC East.
In all, McCarthy went 53-23-2 against the division, a winning percentage of .692. He was 19-7 (.731) against Chicago, 18-7 (.720) against Detroit and 16-9-2 (.629) against Minnesota.
Like much of Jason Garrett’s 9 ½-year tenure in Dallas, Garrett’s work in the most important aspect of winning was average. In his 152 regular-season games, the Cowboys finished minus-2 in turnover differential. In his five playoff games, they were plus-1. Like McCarthy, Garrett had an outstanding record against the NFC East, finishing 38-20 (.655). Now McCarthy can go after further divisional domination with the NFC East coming off a terrible season in which it easily ranked as the weakest of the eight divisions.
McCarthy earned his spurs as an assistant coach tutoring quarterbacks. If he’s said it once he said it 100 times: His most important job as a head coach was to make the quarterback successful.
When McCarthy returned to the Packers in 2006 (he had been their quarterbacks coach in 1999 under Ray Rhodes) Brett Favre’s career was in disarray. The Packers had finished 4-12 in ’05, and Favre’s career-high total of 29 interceptions and 70.9 passer rating were part of the problem.
Immediately, Favre and McCarthy rekindled what had been a strong relationship, and under McCarthy’s firm but steady guidance Favre toned down his impulsiveness, relished a more check-with-me system at the line of scrimmage and posted his best passer rating (95.7) in 11 years as the Packers went 13-3 in 2007.
Few will remember the start of Rodgers’ career. Two years in, there were as many scouts who believed his career would be a bust as there were those who didn’t. He couldn’t have been less impressive.
When I asked Bill Walsh in a 2006 interview if he considered Rodgers, the former Cal quarterback, to be maxed out physically, he said, “That’s right. What you see is what you get. He doesn’t have a great (deal) more potential that doesn’t show. He was part of a system and real outstanding coach (Jeff Tedford) in college and all of that. I don’t know where it’s going to take him.”
McCarthy took a hands-on approach with the quarterback who he rated beneath Alex Smith during his one season as offensive coordinator in San Francisco. Rodgers made dramatic changes in his ball carriage and delivery, increased his arm strength and overall strength, learned about leadership and, by his fourth season, was ready to roll as Favre’s successor.
McCarthy served as his own play-caller on offense until 2015 when he made the mistake of relinquishing those duties to Tom Clements, a trusted assistant and the other individual who deserves substantial credit for developing Rodgers. He returned to play-calling late that season after Rodgers went into a funk from mid-season on. Even though the Packers are entering the playoffs with a 13-3 season, Rodgers and their passing game have seldom regained their pre-2015 pizzazz.
On Thanksgiving Day a year ago, 10 days before McCarthy was fired, CBS analyst Tony Romo said during a telecast, “The league is going to motion and misdirection before the snap … Mike McCarthy just has guys standing there and lets Rodgers do what he wants … jet motion has hurt defenses. It’s really what changed the NFL.”
Continuing to live in Green Bay, McCarthy converted a portion of his compound into a high-tech studio where he and several other unemployed coaches spent the season breaking down tape and analyzing trends. In a series of interviews last month, he pledged to become less static in his approach to offense if accorded another coaching opportunity.
Generally, McCarthy permitted defensive coordinators Bob Sanders, Dom Capers and Mike Pettine to run their own show. He did become heavily involved in game-planning as well as philosophy toward the end of Capers’ nine-year run. Special teams were his Achilles’ heel. Based on Rick Gosselin’s annual rankings, the Carolina Panthers were the only team that had worse special teams during McCarthy’s tenure than the Packers.
McCarthy can be ruthless. He fired 16 assistant coaches in 13 years, including five coordinators. Four others departed after their contracts expired; in at least three of the cases they could be considered firings. Another coach was pressured to retire.
In the area of special teams, McCarthy forced out coordinators Mike Stock, Shawn Slocum and Ron Zook as well as assistants Curtis Fuller and Chad Morton, all to no avail.
General manager Ted Thompson hired McCarthy and had the power to fire him until he was pushed aside after the 2017 season. Team president Mark Murphy fired McCarthy within an hour after the 12th game a year ago. There were between 15,000 and 20,000 no-shows at Lambeau Field when the Packers lost to Arizona, in December no less.
A 13 ½-point favorite over the lowly Cardinals, the Packers suffered their worst defeat at home in 51 years, according to the odds. Public sentiment had turned against McCarthy despite the Super Bowl triumph, the nine playoff appearances and the six NFC North championships.
McCarthy wanted to finish the season and was shocked to be summoned to Murphy’s office so soon after the Cardinals game and quickly dismissed. By doing so, Murphy placed McCarthy, the second-winningest coach in franchise history, in company with Gene Ronzani (14-31-1) as the only Packers’ coach to get canned during the season.
So now McCarthy will inherit a team that missed the playoff this season after a disappointing 8-8 season but is 40-24 since 2016. The offense, which led the NFL in yards (6,904) and yards per play (6.5), offers tremendous potential with quarterback Dak Prescott, Pro Bowl running back Ezekiel Elliott, some high-caliber wide receivers and three Pro Bowl offensive linemen.
There will be many dramatic changes for McCarthy, not the least of which is having his boss serve as the face of the franchise.
The media-shy Thompson avoided interviews like rabies, leaving McCarthy to serve as the single voice. It’s a role Jerry Jones revels in.
By the time the Packers defeated the Pittsburgh Steelers at AT&T Stadium in the 45th Super Bowl, McCarthy had become a powerful voice behind any podium. During the injury-ravaged 2010 season, McCarthy famously insisted the Packers were “nobody’s underdog,” and with his uber-confidence spreading throughout the locker room his team went all the way as the NFC’s sixth seed.
In later years, McCarthy became less engaged in press conferences even though the press corps in Wisconsin can’t be compared to the aggressive tone of the media contingent that will greet him in Dallas.
Over time, McCarthy learned to curb what past associates have described as a volcanic temper. Though somewhat inarticulate and at times thin-skinned, McCarthy can charm acquaintances with his ability to tell a story.
By and large, McCarthy was popular with players. He lessened their physical workload over time, and almost never threw any of them under the proverbial bus. He will have a carefully constructed plan, a rigid schedule and the motivation to prove he’s a lot better than his finish in Green Bay.
In the past few weeks, McCarthy has told people he just wants to coach. He seems to recognize his shortcomings in game management, and in interviews appears all in when it comes to analytics and their expanding role in the NFL game.
Thompson performed poorly in his last two or three years as the GM in Green Bay. Privately, McCarthy complained about Thompson’s inactivity when it came to adding players from outside the organization.
Now McCarthy is joining the Cowboys, for whom Jerry Jones and his son, Stephen, can provide him with more resources than he has known and a willingness to gamble on greatness in everything they do.
The Jones family needed someone to lead the men in their locker room, instill a new message and spirit, and turn a team of consistent underachievers into one of achievers.
McCarthy did that once, a decade ago at least when it comes to reaching the Super Bowl. Time will tell if he’s capable of it again.
.
