- Joined
- Apr 7, 2013
- Messages
- 120,142
[h=1][/h]
By: C.C. Boorman | 22 minutes ago
Every NFL draft selection meeting is a study in drama. There are always the crucial moments that fans are told about as they are shared in story form by team decision-makers after the fact. Some truths get bathed in a sea of glossy public relations narratives about sticking to processes and philosophies. And some are just outright lies concealed in a mask of optimism, where teams always love what they got, hit on their boards that were flawless and feel like they are now a better team.
This draft was no different for the Dallas Cowboys, even though the team did its best to minimize the impact of having no first-round pick by encouraging fans to bide their time in the opening round by watching Amari Cooper highlights. There are always key instances where the success of the team for the upcoming year and subsequent seasons can be determined by how well fate married with circumstance, driving the decisions that are made.
Here are some of those moments to ponder until we can see the results play out in the near future. [h=1]The 2nd Round Pick [/h]
The team’s choice in the 2nd round was significant, despite the tendency for some to factor in that Cooper was technically the Cowboys’ first pick. This selection will ultimately set the tone for the entire incoming draft class and it was important to nail the pick and at least get a future starter, if not an impact player.
The choice spent on Trysten Hill has been met with mixed reactions. The player himself has legitimate intangible concerns that are a volatile mix with his prime athleticism and remarkable physical attributes. That stated, the pick cannot be defined as a true “best player available” decision as there was certainly an element of need involved.
Sign up for the Cowboys Wire email newsletter to get our top stories in your inbox every morning
Rarely can teams make the “BPA” fallacy fit. “Need” will often encroach on drafting pure to a board. Economics and future forecasting for the roster become part of that “need”. The club’s ascribed value to the position also matters.
Clearly, the Cowboys valued the three-technique position in this draft over the safety position. This is a source of dissonance as they had spent a significant amount of time, resources and mental capital in studying the safety group, especially Virginia’s Juan Thornhill.
Owner Jerry Jones did address was able to explain the final result:
“I think that disrupting the passer helps makes safeties play better. It makes it easier for them to do their thing, easier to cover, easier for the quarterback to not be as accurate, easier for the quarterback to have to throw quicker, easier for the quarterback to have to disrupt the plans of the offense. When you can get rush and disruption, which is what we think his game is, (that) is where it starts.”
It is interesting that this organization’s stance has seemingly pivoted suddenly. The Cowboys had a similar scenario to this in years past where interior pressure was ultimately passed over in favor of other facets.
Just once in the past 12 drafts has Dallas dropped a premium draft choice on an interior pressure player (Maliek Collins, 2016 3rd round) and looking long-term, the team has not spent their initial pick on defensive tackle since Russell Maryland, a span of 28 selection meetings.
The infamous 2013 draft where the Cowboys dropped from the 23rd overall slot to the 31st is a prime example to illustrate the recent trend. In this instance, they were able to draft C Travis Frederick, making it a calculated risk that has paid off extremely well. At the time, it was controversial, but mainly because it was perceived that Frederick was a reach and that the team did not get enough return for an eight spot drop.
What is not often recalled was that the player that many linked to Dallas at that moment of decision, Florida DT Sharrif Floyd, was considered among the top two DTs in that class. Instead, the Cowboys passed and since have not even come close to spending a top resource on a defensive interior pressure player.
The question is what changed?
Marinelli, at least as a Cowboys coach, has always seemed to prefer the high-motor players inside over the physical freaks like he had in Tampa with Warren Sapp and Tommie Harris with the Bears. Perhaps the potential demonstrated by David Irving made them re-think or maybe Hill is just that rare of a talent.
But make no mistake, this is not a long-term philosophy coming into place as you are being led to believe. With this choice, time will tell, as it always does, if the organization made the right collective decision. [h=1]The Trade Downs [/h]
The Cowboys had just drafted RB/WR Tony Pollard with the No. 128 pick and handshakes, hugs, fist pumps and high-fives were on full display from the Cowboy War Room Cam.
After three picks in the first four rounds, there was still another selection to look forward to, which was pick number at slot No. 136. Then something happened. The Cowboys traded down with the Cincinnati Bengals, Dallas received picks No. 149 and 213 in exchange.
As Stephen Jones confessed, there were some that got away.
“We lost some guys that we were right on the cusp of getting. At the same time, we had a good board put together and felt good how we went about it. We traded back a few times, which I think usually happens when you lose a guy or two, not necessarily trying to make a quick pick. I felt good about doing that, and we ended up picking up a couple players.”
There are likely two players who likely fell into that category: Houston corner Isaiah Johnson and Charleston DE John Cominsky.
Johnson was not a pre-draft visitor but was a Kris Richard favorite and it would have been no surprise if he were chosen. Richard worked out Johnson pre-draft and there is scuttlebutt he gave Johnson a heads up that Dallas would indeed draft him. The Cowboys instead chose a specialty player in Pollard and Johnson promptly went with the very next pick.
Cominsky on the other hand was an “Official 30” visitor. He went to the Falcons at pick No. 135, right in front of the Cowboys’ noses one spot ahead of them.
Following the first trade back, the Cowboys were sitting at number 149 poised to make their selection, then another trade was announced. This time, Dallas was trading down again, in this case with Mike Mayock and the Oakland Raiders, gaining selection No. 158 and No. 213. The player picked at the 49ers spot right above them was yet another “Official 30” visitor in LB Dre Greenlaw.
At the end of the day, the Cowboys did appear to recover some of their losses, grabbing the lengthy cornerback they craved in Michael Jackson, Sr. in place of Johnson and the strongside DE in Joe Jackson for Cominsky.
These kind of scenarios are nothing new to the fickle machinations of the draft or really to the Cowboys themselves. This kind of precedence was illustrated previously in the 2009 draft.
What the team does after having his desired targets denied to them has not always been a smooth recovery. In the case of Unger, the team wanted him at the 51st spot and got jumped by Seattle, prompting a trade down with the Bills moving completely out of the 2nd round, believing there was more bang for the buck by stockpiling more picks in the later rounds. That draft eventually was one of the most disastrous in team history where the continued pick swapping downward resulted in twelve picks of which only a handful of players actually stuck.
Coincidentally, that 2009 selection meeting was the last one the Cowboys did not have the ownership of their own first round pick prior to draft day.
The silver lining is that experience with being stymied during the draft may have make them motivated to make choices with conviction, getting their man when they are there. That may be the case here with Hill, who has had some suggesting a reach based on need.
Another lesson learned may be to avoid telecasting interest which could defeat that end result, which still seems to be an on-going practice that the team does not have reservations about publicizing. It very well could have cost them after the fourth round where several prospects eluded their grasp.
The best case here is that the Cowboys have learned from past draft frustration pain points and made the right choices under fire.
The stories from each draft are what make them so unique and it should be intriguing to visit in future years how the Cowboys handled the forks in the draft game road.
By: C.C. Boorman | 22 minutes ago
Every NFL draft selection meeting is a study in drama. There are always the crucial moments that fans are told about as they are shared in story form by team decision-makers after the fact. Some truths get bathed in a sea of glossy public relations narratives about sticking to processes and philosophies. And some are just outright lies concealed in a mask of optimism, where teams always love what they got, hit on their boards that were flawless and feel like they are now a better team.
This draft was no different for the Dallas Cowboys, even though the team did its best to minimize the impact of having no first-round pick by encouraging fans to bide their time in the opening round by watching Amari Cooper highlights. There are always key instances where the success of the team for the upcoming year and subsequent seasons can be determined by how well fate married with circumstance, driving the decisions that are made.
Here are some of those moments to ponder until we can see the results play out in the near future. [h=1]The 2nd Round Pick [/h]
The team’s choice in the 2nd round was significant, despite the tendency for some to factor in that Cooper was technically the Cowboys’ first pick. This selection will ultimately set the tone for the entire incoming draft class and it was important to nail the pick and at least get a future starter, if not an impact player.
The choice spent on Trysten Hill has been met with mixed reactions. The player himself has legitimate intangible concerns that are a volatile mix with his prime athleticism and remarkable physical attributes. That stated, the pick cannot be defined as a true “best player available” decision as there was certainly an element of need involved.
Sign up for the Cowboys Wire email newsletter to get our top stories in your inbox every morning
Rarely can teams make the “BPA” fallacy fit. “Need” will often encroach on drafting pure to a board. Economics and future forecasting for the roster become part of that “need”. The club’s ascribed value to the position also matters.
Clearly, the Cowboys valued the three-technique position in this draft over the safety position. This is a source of dissonance as they had spent a significant amount of time, resources and mental capital in studying the safety group, especially Virginia’s Juan Thornhill.
Owner Jerry Jones did address was able to explain the final result:
“I think that disrupting the passer helps makes safeties play better. It makes it easier for them to do their thing, easier to cover, easier for the quarterback to not be as accurate, easier for the quarterback to have to throw quicker, easier for the quarterback to have to disrupt the plans of the offense. When you can get rush and disruption, which is what we think his game is, (that) is where it starts.”
It is interesting that this organization’s stance has seemingly pivoted suddenly. The Cowboys had a similar scenario to this in years past where interior pressure was ultimately passed over in favor of other facets.
Just once in the past 12 drafts has Dallas dropped a premium draft choice on an interior pressure player (Maliek Collins, 2016 3rd round) and looking long-term, the team has not spent their initial pick on defensive tackle since Russell Maryland, a span of 28 selection meetings.
The infamous 2013 draft where the Cowboys dropped from the 23rd overall slot to the 31st is a prime example to illustrate the recent trend. In this instance, they were able to draft C Travis Frederick, making it a calculated risk that has paid off extremely well. At the time, it was controversial, but mainly because it was perceived that Frederick was a reach and that the team did not get enough return for an eight spot drop.
What is not often recalled was that the player that many linked to Dallas at that moment of decision, Florida DT Sharrif Floyd, was considered among the top two DTs in that class. Instead, the Cowboys passed and since have not even come close to spending a top resource on a defensive interior pressure player.
The question is what changed?
Marinelli, at least as a Cowboys coach, has always seemed to prefer the high-motor players inside over the physical freaks like he had in Tampa with Warren Sapp and Tommie Harris with the Bears. Perhaps the potential demonstrated by David Irving made them re-think or maybe Hill is just that rare of a talent.
But make no mistake, this is not a long-term philosophy coming into place as you are being led to believe. With this choice, time will tell, as it always does, if the organization made the right collective decision. [h=1]The Trade Downs [/h]
The Cowboys had just drafted RB/WR Tony Pollard with the No. 128 pick and handshakes, hugs, fist pumps and high-fives were on full display from the Cowboy War Room Cam.
After three picks in the first four rounds, there was still another selection to look forward to, which was pick number at slot No. 136. Then something happened. The Cowboys traded down with the Cincinnati Bengals, Dallas received picks No. 149 and 213 in exchange.
As Stephen Jones confessed, there were some that got away.
“We lost some guys that we were right on the cusp of getting. At the same time, we had a good board put together and felt good how we went about it. We traded back a few times, which I think usually happens when you lose a guy or two, not necessarily trying to make a quick pick. I felt good about doing that, and we ended up picking up a couple players.”
There are likely two players who likely fell into that category: Houston corner Isaiah Johnson and Charleston DE John Cominsky.
Johnson was not a pre-draft visitor but was a Kris Richard favorite and it would have been no surprise if he were chosen. Richard worked out Johnson pre-draft and there is scuttlebutt he gave Johnson a heads up that Dallas would indeed draft him. The Cowboys instead chose a specialty player in Pollard and Johnson promptly went with the very next pick.
Cominsky on the other hand was an “Official 30” visitor. He went to the Falcons at pick No. 135, right in front of the Cowboys’ noses one spot ahead of them.
Following the first trade back, the Cowboys were sitting at number 149 poised to make their selection, then another trade was announced. This time, Dallas was trading down again, in this case with Mike Mayock and the Oakland Raiders, gaining selection No. 158 and No. 213. The player picked at the 49ers spot right above them was yet another “Official 30” visitor in LB Dre Greenlaw.
At the end of the day, the Cowboys did appear to recover some of their losses, grabbing the lengthy cornerback they craved in Michael Jackson, Sr. in place of Johnson and the strongside DE in Joe Jackson for Cominsky.
These kind of scenarios are nothing new to the fickle machinations of the draft or really to the Cowboys themselves. This kind of precedence was illustrated previously in the 2009 draft.
What the team does after having his desired targets denied to them has not always been a smooth recovery. In the case of Unger, the team wanted him at the 51st spot and got jumped by Seattle, prompting a trade down with the Bills moving completely out of the 2nd round, believing there was more bang for the buck by stockpiling more picks in the later rounds. That draft eventually was one of the most disastrous in team history where the continued pick swapping downward resulted in twelve picks of which only a handful of players actually stuck.
Coincidentally, that 2009 selection meeting was the last one the Cowboys did not have the ownership of their own first round pick prior to draft day.
The silver lining is that experience with being stymied during the draft may have make them motivated to make choices with conviction, getting their man when they are there. That may be the case here with Hill, who has had some suggesting a reach based on need.
Another lesson learned may be to avoid telecasting interest which could defeat that end result, which still seems to be an on-going practice that the team does not have reservations about publicizing. It very well could have cost them after the fourth round where several prospects eluded their grasp.
The best case here is that the Cowboys have learned from past draft frustration pain points and made the right choices under fire.
The stories from each draft are what make them so unique and it should be intriguing to visit in future years how the Cowboys handled the forks in the draft game road.
